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CHRISTINE J. ALBERTSON, Appellant, v. JOSEPH
RABOFF, Respondent.
[1] Libel and Slander-Slander of Title-Pleading-Effect of Ap-

9.
page

!tis
din

[2]
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peal in Prior Action.-Where plaintiff appealed in a prior
action, only from that part of a judgment which made a money
award to defendant, and such part was severable from the
part which determined that defendant had no interest in or
right to a lien on plaintiff's real property, the part )f the judgment unappealed from became final 60 days after the date
thereof (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(e), and plaintiff's complaint
for disparagement of title, filed after expiration of such 60day period, was not premature notwithstanding that her appeal
from the judgment in the prior action was still pending.
Id.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-Although the gravamen of
an action for disparagement of title is different from that of
an action for personal defamation, substantially the same
privileges are recognized in relation to both torts, in the
absence of statute, and questions of privilege in relation to
both torts are now resolved in the light of Civ. Code, § 47.
Id.-Privileged Communications-Absolute Privilege.-Publications made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 2.)
Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Concluded.-Any one with
actual notice of the pendency of a proceeding who acquires
an interest in the property involved takes subject to any judgment that may be rendered therein. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908,
subd.2.)
Lis Pendens-Purpose.-The sole purpose of recording a notice
of lis pendens is to bind any person who may acquire an interest in the realty involved by giving constructive notice of a
proceeding affecting such property.

[3] See Ca1.Jur., Libel and Slander, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur., Libel
and Slander, § 125.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Lis Pendens, § 1 et seq.; Am.Jur., Lis Pendens,
§ 2 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Libel and Slander, § 103(2); [2, 8-10,
12] Libel and Slander; § 102.5; [3, 11] Libel and Slander, § 29 (1) ;
r4] Judgments, § 430; [5, 6] Lis Pendens, § 1; [7] Lis Pendens,
§ 6; [13] Malicious Prosecution, § 1; [14, 15] Malicious Prosecution, § 32; [16] Malicious Prosecution, § 10; [17] Judgments, § 406.
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[6] Id.-Nature.-A notice of lis pendens is purely incidental to
the action wherein it is filed; it refers specifically to such
action and has no existence apart from it.
[7] Id.-Effect.-Since the effect of a lis pendens is to gjge constructive notice of all the facts apparent on the face of the
pleadings and of those other facts of which the facts so stated
necessarily put a purchaser on inquiry, the recordation of a
~otice of lis pendens is in effect a republication. of the pleadmgs.
[8] Libel and Slander-Slander of Title-Privilege.-Where disparagement of title arises from the recordation of a notice of
. lis pendens as well as from the pleadings, both publication of
the pleadings and the republication thereof by recording a
notice of lis pendens are clothed with absolute privilege.
(9] Id.-Slander of Title--Privilege.-Recordation of a notice of
lis pendens is entitled to absolute privilege because the purpose
of Civ. Code, § 47, is to afford litigants the utmost freedom
of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for defamation, and because subd. 4 of that code section extends the privilege to
reports of judicial proceedings in public journals. (Disapproving West Investment Co. v. Moorhead, 120 Cal.App.2d
837, 840, 841, 262 P.2d 322.)
[10] Id.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-The privilege conferred by
Civ. Code, § 47, applies to any publication, such as the recordation of a notice ()f lis pendens, that is required or permitted by
law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the
objects of the litigation, though the pUblication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is
invoked.
[11] Id.-Privileged Communications-Absolute Privilege.-lf a
publication within the privilege conferred by Civ. Code, § 47,
has a reasonable relation to the action and is permitted by law;-the absolute privilege attaches.
[12] Id.-Slander of Title-Privilege.-An absolute privilege attaches to the recordation of a notice of lis pendens, since.
s~ch· a publication is permitted by law and, like other docu- .
ments that may be filed in an action, it has a reasonable relation thereto, and it is immaterial that it is recorded with the
county recorder instead of being filed with the county elerk.
(Disapproving statement in Gudger v. Manton, 21 Ca1.2d 537,
545, 134 P.2d 217, that "The levy of a writ of execution is Dot
an act in the course of a judicial proceeding.")
[13] l\ialicious Prosecution-Availability of Action.-The faet a
communication may be absolutely privileged for the purposN
of a defamation action does not prevent its being an cleIlleDt
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of an action for malicious prosecution in a proper case, since
the policy of encouraging free access to the courts that underlies the absolute privilege applicable in defamation actions
is outweighed by the policy of affording redress for individual
wrongs when the requirements of favorable termination, lack
of probable cause and malice are satisfied.
[14] Ide - Pleading - Want of Probable Cause.-Since probable
cause requires a reasonable belief in the validity of the c~aim
asserted, allegations that an action was prosecuted with knowledge of the falsity of the claim are a sufficient statement of
lack of probable cause.
[15] ld.-Pleading-Malice.-The requirement of malice is sufficiently pleaded in an action for malicious prosecution where
the existence of malice is expressly alleged and where there
are also allegations that a claim to the property involved was
asserted with knowledge of its falsity.
[16] ld.-Malice.-The malice required in an action for malicious
prosecution is not limited to actual hostilty or ill will toward
plaintiff but exists when the proceedings are instituted PrImarily for an improper purpose.
[17] Judgments-Res Judicata-Findings Unnecessary and lmmaterial.-Findings on unnecessary and immaterial issues are
not conclusive in a subsequent action between the same parties.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Louis H. Burke, Judge. Reversed.
Action for slander of title. Judgment of dismissal reversed.
Charles

~furstein

and Albert E. Wheatcroft for Appellant.

-- Paul R.Hutchinson ande. L. Gardner for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-In 1948 defendant brought an action
against plaintiff in which he sought a money judgment and
either a lien on real property owned by plaintiff or a judgment
declaring that her title was obtained from her husband without consideration and in fraud of creditors. Defendant recorded a notice of pendency of this action in the county recorder's office of the county in which the real property is located.
[14] Necessity and sufficiency of allegations in complaint for
malicious prosecution or tort action analogous thereto that
defendant or defendants acted without probable cause, note,
14 A.L.R.2d 264. See also Cal.Jur., Malicious Prosecution, § 13;
Am.Jur., Malicious Prosecution, § 116.
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After a trial of the action, judgment was entered in favor of
plaintiff on defendant's claims of a lien on or an interest in
plaintiff's real property. Defendant did not appeal. Plaintiff appealed only from that part of the judgment awarding
money to defendant, and that part of the judgment was
affirmed. (RabofJ v. Albertson, 122 Cal.App.2d 555 [265 P.2d
139] .)
In the present action, plaintiff alleges that defendant knew
at the time of filing his complaint in the prior action that he
had no right to a lien on or an interest in her real property,
that he nevertheless knowingly and maliciously asserted false
claims thereto, and that by recording a notice of lis pendens
he disparaged her title to her damage. The court sustained defendant's objection to the introduction of evidence on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action
(see Perry v. Futch, 119 Cal.App.2d 556, 559 [259 P.2d 971])
and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals.
[1] Defendant contends that plaintiff's complaint herein
was filed while her appeal from the judgment in the prior
action was still pending and was therefore premature. In the
prior action plaintiff appealed only from the part of the
judgment that made an award of money to defendant. That
part of the judgment was severable from the part that deter- .
mined that defendant had no interest in or right to a lien upon
plaintiff's real property. No appeal was taken from the latter
part of the judgment, and it became final 60 days after the
date thereof. (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(a) ; American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210, 216 [246 P.2d 935] ;
G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 667 [143 P.
1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362-363 [125 P. 904,
~Ann.Cas. 1913E 1319].)
Plaintiff's complaint bereinwas_~ __ ~~·./~_
. filed after the time for appeal had expired and was therefore
not premature.
Defendant contends that the recordation of a notice of lu
pendens is absolutely privileged and that therefore no cause
of action for disparagement of title is stated. [2] Although·.··
the gravamen of an action for disparagement of title is different from that of an action for personal defamation (Coley v.
Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 27 [272 P. 1045] ; Smith v. Stuthman, 79
Cal.App.2d 708, 709 [181 P.2d 123]), substantially the same
privileges are recognized in relation to both torts in the absence
of statute. (See Rest., Torts, §§ 585 et seq., 635 et seq.; Prosser.
Torts, 2d ed. 767.) Questions of privilege relating to both
torts are now resolved in the light of section 47 of the Civil
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Cocte. [3] Thus, subdivision 2 of section 47 states the longestablished rule that publications made in the course of a
judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged (Gosewisch v.
Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 513-515 [119 P. 656, Ann. Cas. 1913D
442] ; Donnell v. Linforth, 11 Cal.App.2d 25, 28-29 [52 P.2d
937] ; Moore v. United States Fid. &- Guar. Co., 122 Cal.App.
205, 210 [9 P.2d 562] ; Rest., Torts,§§ 635-639), and the question presented therefore is whether a notice of lis pendens recorded as authorized by section 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure* is a pUblication in the course of a judicial proceeding.
[4] Anyone with actual notice of the pendency of the proceeding who acquires an interest in the property takes subject
to any judgm~nt that may be rendered therein. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1908, subd. 2.) [6] The sole purpose of recording a
notice of lis pendens is to secure the same result by giving constructive notice of the pendency of the proceeding. [6] Its
effectiveness depends entirely on the action of which it is a
part and to which it calls attention. It" is purely incidental
to the action wherein it is filed. It refers specifically to such
action and has no existence apart from it." (Garcia v.
Pinhero, 22 Cal.App.2d 194. 197 [70 P.2d 675].) [7] Since
"the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all
the facts apparent upon the face of the pleadings, and of
those other facts of which the facts so stated necessarily put a
purchaser on inquiry.... " (Harris v. Whittier Bldg. &- LOan
Assn., 18 Cal.App.2d 260, 266 [63 P.2d 840]), the recordation
of a notice of lis pendens is in effect a republication of the
pleadings. [8] The disparagement of title arises, therefore,
from the recordation . . of the notice of lis pendens as well as
from the pleadings. The publication of the pleadings is unquestionably clothed with absolute privilege, and we have concluded that the republication thereof by recording a notice
of lis pendens is similarly privileged.
The recording of such a notice is expressly authorized by
section 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which not only
·"In an action affecting the title or right of possession of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant,
at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such
answer, or at any time afterwards, may record in the office of the
recorder of the county in which the property is situated, a notice of the
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record
only, shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby
be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names."
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identifies the persons who may record the notice and spec>ifies
the place of recordation and the time it may be made, but
specifies that it may be done "in an action." The Legislature
apparently regarded the recordation authorized in section 409
of the Code of Civil Procedure as being made "in a judicial
proceeding" within the meaning of section 47 of the Civil
Code, for any publication" in an action" is unquestionably" in
a judicial proceeding." [9] We do not rest our opinion, however, on the narrow ground that the word "in" is used in both
sections or that the use of that word is of decisive significance,
but on the obvious purpose of section 47 to afford litigants the
utmost freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend
their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for
defamation. (See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:
Judicial Proceedings, 9 Columb.L.Rev. 463, 469.) It would
be anomalous to hold that a litigant is privileged to make a
publication necessary to bring an action· but that he can be
sued for defamation if he lets anyone know that he has
brought it (see Thompson v. White, 70 Cal. 135, 136 [11 P.
564] ), particularly when he is expressly authorized by statute
to let all the world know that he has brought it. Furthermore,
subdivision 4 of section 47 of the Civil Code extends the privilege to reports of judicial proceedings in public journals. It
cannot reasonably be held that the Legislature meant to accord such journals a greater immunity for giving actual notice.
of a proceeding to their numerous readers than that accorded
litigants for giving the constructive notice thereof that the
. Legislature has authorized them to give.
Relying -on West Inv. 00. v. Moorhead, 120 Cal.App.2d 837,
840-841 [262 P.2d 322]), plaintiff contends that the recorda_.tion of a notice of lis pendens is merely a "private act under------~.·
taken dehors the judicial proceeding for the purpose of calling
to the attention of all the world the pendency of litigation
a1fecting the designated real property" and is not "in" a
judicial proceeding for" [N] 0 function of the court or its officers is invoked; no machinery associated with the judicial
process is set in motion." By stressing the word "in" this
contention would limit the privilege to the pleadings and the
subsequent communications of the judge, counsel, jurors,
parties, and witnesses in the actual course of the proceeding.
Since we do not believe that the privilege is so limited, West
]nv. 00. v. Moorhead, supra, is disapproved.
[10] It is our opinion that the privilege applies to any
publication, such as the recordation of a notice of lis pendens,
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that is required (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 749) or permitted
(e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 409) by law in the course of a judicial
proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though
the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function
of the court or its officers is invoked. (See 53 C.J.S., Libel and
Slander, § 104, p. 168.) Thus, it is not limited to the pleadings, the oral or written evidence, to pUblications in open court
or in briefs or affidavits. [11] If the publication has a reasonable relation to the action and is permitted by law, the
absolute privilege attaches. (See Rest., Torts, § 587; Youmans
v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 220 [47 N.E. 265] ; Kraushaar v.' Lavin,
39 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882-883; Zirn V. Oullom, 63 N.Y.S.2d 439,
440-441; Inselberg v. Trosty, 190 Misc. 507 [77 N.Y.S.2d 457,
458; ct. 39 A.L.R.2d 840-861.) [12] It therefore attaches to the
recordation of a notice of lis pendenR, for such a publication is
permitted by law, and like other documents that may be filed
in an action, it has a reasonable relation thereto and it is immaterial that it is recorded with the county recorder instead
of being filed with the county clerk.
G~tdger V. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537 [134 P.2d 217], on which
the court in West Inv. 00. v. Moorhead, supra, 120 Cal.App.2d
837, relied, involved an action for slander of title for the
wrongful recordation and levy of a writ of execution against
the property of a person who was not a party to the action.
The original judgment was obtained against the wife for a
premarital tort. The writ of execution, however, was recorded
and levied against her husband's separate property and had
no reasonable relation to the action against the wife. The
statement in the opinion in that case that" The levy of a writ
of execution is not an act in the course of a judicial proceeding" (21 Cal.2d at 545) was unnecessary to the decision
therein and is disapproved.
Ooley V. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22 [272 P. 1045], on which the
court in the West Inv. 00. case, supra, also relied, involved an
action for slander of title in which the plaintiff alleged that
after he had taken an appeal from the judgment of the San
Francisco Superior Court and filed a stay bond approved by
the court, defendant maliciously filed an abstract of judgment
with the county recorder of San Joaquin County for the purpose of slandering the title of plaintiff's lands in that county.
The defendant sought a change of venue, but the court held
that slander of title is an injury to real property and the venue
of an action therefor was in the county where the property is

382

)

)

ALBERTSON V. RABOFF

[46 C.2d

situated. Thus, the issue in that case was simply one of venue
and it was unnecessary to consider the question of privilege.
Plaintiff contends that her complaint states a cause of action
for malicious prosecution. [13] It may be noted at the outset that the fact that a communication may be absolutely privileged for the purposes of a defamation action does not prevent
its being an element of an action for malicious prosecution in
a proper case. The policy of encouraging free access to the
courts that underlies the absolute privilege applicable in defamation actions is outweighed by the policy of affording redress
for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable
termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied.
(See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Ca1.2d 146, 159-160 [114 P.2d 335, 135
A.L.R. 775] ; Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum, 121 Cal.App.2d 64,
68 [262 P.2d 596] ; 3 Rest., Torts, p. 380, Introductory note;
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Columb.L.Rev. 463, 470.)
As indicated above, that part of the judgment in the
former action that determined that defendant had no interest
in or a right to a lien upon plaintiff's real property is now
final and constitutes a termination of that separable part of
the proceeding favorable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that "defendant herein well knew of
the fact that he ... was making unfounded and untrue statements as to the transfer and conveyance of said real property
or any part or portion thereof, but that thereafter and notwithstanding the notice by plaintiff's attorney hereinabove
mentioned, the defendant persisted in filing amended complaints ... , in all of which, he, the said defendant, continued
to assert claims falsely and maliciously in and to the aforemen. - Honed real property," and that" at the times herein mentioned, the defendant herein well. knew that he . . . had no
right, title, estate or interest in or to the aforementioned real
property or any part or portion thereof.... " .
[14] Since probable cause requires a reasonable belief in
the validity of the claim asserted (Franzen v. Shenk, 192
Cal. 572, 578 [221 P. 932] ; Vann v. McCreary, 77 Cal. 434
[19 P. 826]; see Rest., Torts, § 662, com. c, § 675, com.
d), the allegations that the action was prosecuted with
knowledge of the falsity of the claim are a sufficient statement of lack of probable cause. (See Pulvermacher v. Los
Angeles Ooordinating Oommittee, 61 ~al.App.2d 704, 707
[143 P.2d 974]; United States Fid. & Guar. 00. v. MiUer,
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218 Ala. 158 [117 So. 668, 669] ; Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289,
294-295 [11 Am.Rep. 10] ; anno., 14 A.L.R.2d 264, 298-299.)
[15] The requirement of malice is also sufficiently pleaded.
Not only is the existence of malice expressly alleged, but the
allegations that a claim to the property was asserted with
knowledge of its falsity also meets that requirement. [16] The
malice required in an action for malicious prosecution is not
limited to actual hostility or ill will toward plaintiff but
exists when the proceedings are instituted primarily for an
improper purpose. (See Singleton v. Perry, 45 Ca1.2d 489,
495 [289 P.2d 794] ; Prosser on Torts [2d ed.] p. 666; ct.
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [197
P.2d 713].) It has been pointed out that the "principal
situations in which the civil proceedings are initiated for an
improper purpose are those in which (1) the person initiating
them does not believe that his claim may be held valid; (2)
the proceedings are begun primarily because of hostility or
ill will; (3) the proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of depriving the person against whom they are initiated
of a beneficial use of his property; (4) the proceedings are
initiated for the. purpose of forcing a settlement which has
no relation to the merits of the claim." (Rest., Torts, § 676,
com. b; see also § 668, com. e.) Clearly a person who
attempts to establish a claim to property knowing of its falsity
can only be motivated by an improper purpose. Plaintiff contends, also, that she has in effect alleged that defendant's purpose in falsely asserting an interest in the property and filing
the lis pendens was to secure the benefit of an attachment
to secure the payment of the money judgment without incurring the burdens thereof. There are no express allegations of this purpose, however, and it is unnecessary to decide whether evidence of such a purpose could be offered
under a general allegation of a malicious motive. Since the
judgment must be reversed, plaintiff will have an opportunity
if she so wishes to amend her complaint expressly to allege
that defendant's purpose in falsely claiming an interest in
her property was to enable him improperly to secure the
benefits of a Us pendens pending his securing of the money
judgment.
Plaintiff incorporated by reference and made a part of her
complaint the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
the judgment in the former proceeding. Defendant contends
that these findings of fact conclusively establish that he had
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probable cause for claiming an interest in plaintiff's property and that therefore the allegations of the complaint to
the contrary must be disregarded. The findings in the former
action recite that defendant lent plaintiff's husband $7,500
to enable him to purchase the real property involved in this
action. Title was taken by plaintiff and her husband as joint
tenants, and plaintiff succeeded to his interest on his death
about 16 months later. In the meantime defendant asked
plaintiff's husband to give him some evidence of the loan,
and the latter delivered an instrument stating: "lOU
$7,500.00. Lee Albertson. August 5th, 1946 on my house."
It was the intent and understanding of defendant and plaintiff's husband that the purpose of this writing was to en·
cumber the property with a lien in plaintiff's favor to secure
the payment of the loan. The trial court found, however,
that "said 1. O. U. is insufficient to create a lien on said real
property. ' ,
In addition to asserting an interest in the property based
on the LO.U., defendant alleged that the original creation
of the joint tenancy constituted a fraud on plaintiff's husband's creditors on the ground that plaintiff's husband was
insolvent at that time. The trial court found that the creation
of the joint tenancy was not an assignment of property by
plaintiff's husband within the meaning of the law governing
fraudulent conveyances and therefore refrained from finding
whether or not plaintiff's husband was insolvent at the time
the joint tenancy was created.
The money judgment against plaintiff was based on findings that plaintiff was personally liable for the balance of
the original loan and was affirmed on the theory thatsh~
. had entered into a binding contract with defendant to discharge her husband's debt. (RabofJ v. Albertson, 122 Cal.
App.2d 555 [265 P.2d 139].)
It may be conceded that the findings with respect to the
intent of defendant and plaintiff's husband to create a lien
on the property by the I.O.U. would be sufficient to establish
probable cause for the institution of proceedings to enforce
the lien and establish defendant's good faith with respect
thereto, if they constitute a binding adjudication of the
facts found. With respect to defendant's claim of a lien
based on the LO.U., however, the only finding necessary to
sustain the trial court's judgment adverse to defendant was
the finding that the writing was insufficient to create a
lien. The findings with respect to the intent and under-
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standing of defendant and plaintiff's husband were unnecessary to the judgment, and since defendant was the prevailing
party to the cause of action based on the I.O.U., she could
not have attacked the unnecessary findings adverse to her on
appeal. [17] Under these circumstances the findings are
not res judicata (Ohapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641, 654655 [58 P. 298, 60 P. 974, 66 P. 982] ; Natural Soda Products
00. v. Oity of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 445-446 [240
P.2d 993]; see 3 Witkin, Cal.Proc., p. 1953), and cannot overcome plaintiff's express allegation that defendant
"well knew that he . . . had no right, title, estate or interest in or to the aforementioned real property.•.• "
Even if it were assumed, however, that defendant had
probable cause to assert a claim to the property based on
the LO.U., it would not follow that plaintiff has failed to
state a cause of action. In the former action defendant also
asserted a claim to the property based on the theory of a
fraudulent conveyance, and with respect to this cause of
action there was no finding whether or not plaintiff's husband
was insolvent at the time the joint tenancy was createdThus, there is nothing in the findings in the former action
contrary to plaintiff's allegations that defendant asserted a
claim based on an alleged fraudulent conveyance with knowledge of the falsity of the facts necessary to sustain it. In
Singleton v. Perry, 45 Ca1.2d 489, 497 [289 P.2d 794], we
held that a defendant cannot escape liability for the malicious
prosecution of an unjustified charge by joining with it a
justified charge, and that in such a case, the plaintiff does not
have the burden of "showing that her damage was specifically
. attributable to the malicious prosecution as_opposed to the
prosecution which . • . was not malicious."
Since the complaint states a cause of action for malicious
prosecution, it was error to sustain defendant's objection to
the introduction of evidence.
The judgment is reversed. Each side to bear its. own costs
on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.
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